Sāṁkhya Karika with Nārāyaṇa Commentaries | Part 2


Triguṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ, sāmānyam acetanaṃ prasavadharmi |
vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ, tadviparītas tathā ca pumān  |11|

11. The Manifested has trine constituents, and is indiscriminative, objective, generic, irrational and productive. So also is Nature. Soul is the reverse in these respects as in those.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Having specified the points of difference between the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles, [the author] now proceeds to enumerate the points of likeness.

The Manifested are Mahat and the rest; the Unmanifested is Nature. The three constituents are goodness, passion, and darkness; they are possessed by Nature, since that is the equipoised condition of the constitutives; and by Intellect and the rest, since they are evolutes of Nature, and hence composed of them.

Indiscriminative, indiscrete from Nature. In Mahat and the rest there is this absence of separation from Nature, because of the identity of cause and effect; Nature, on the other hand, is so per se.

Objective, distinct from knowledge. Not of the form of knowledge, as the Yogacharas say; if it were so, it would not be possible for what is one to be enjoyed acquired) by many; knowledge of each being particular and individual.

Common, being alike through the constitutive factors; or because enjoyable (i.e., experiencable) by all souls, like a harlot.

Irrational, not possessing self-illuminative intelligence through lack of insight (luminosity).

Productive, causing the evolution of others; since from Intellect spring Egoism and the rest, and from Nature springs Intellect.

Thus the points of likeness between the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles have been described. Now the points of likeness and unlikeness between these principles, [on the one hand], and the soul, [on the other], are specified: Soul is, etc.

Soul is the opposite of the Manifested and the Unmanifested since it is devoid of ‘qualities,’ not objective, non-generic, intelligent and unproductive. It is further like Nature being uncaused and so forth, and it is also like the discrete principles through multiplicity.

This is the sense.

Prītyaprītivishādātmakāḥ prakāshapravṛttirniyamārthāḥ |
anyoanyābhibhavāśraya, jananamithunavrittayash ca guṇāḥ  |12|

12 The constituents are [respectively] characterised by pleasure, pain and dullness, and are adapted to manifestation, activity and restraint; [they] mutually subdue, support, and produce each other, as also consort and function together.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

The three constituent factors have been spoken of; their nature, objects, and functions are next explained, The constituents, etc.:

The constituent powers, goodness, passion and darkness, are respectively pleasant, [painful and dull]. Pleasure [or] happiness comprehends simplicity, softness, modesty, reverence, forgiveness, compassion and the like. Pain [or] misery comprehends hatred, violence, malice, censure, humiliation, etc. Dullness [or] stupefaction comprehends deceit, fear, impiety, wickedness, imbecility, ignorance, etc. Where any of these is to be found, the corresponding constituent is to be presumed, this is the sense.

The characteristics having been specified, their [respective] objects are [next] enumerated, are adapted, etc. Manifestation, [that is], illumination, activity, and restraint are the respective ends or objects of goodness, passion, and darkness. Thus, goodness directed by passion produces effects, unless restrained by enveloping darkness; so obstructed by darkness the other fails in its object; therefore this obstruction is to be considered as the end of the [third constituent].

Mutually, etc. “Mutually” and “functioning” are to be construed with all the four.

Have mutual subjugation for their function; thus, the prevalence of goodness, by the repression of passion and darkness, brings about soothing (or solace); similarly, passion, by overpowering the rest, produces terror, and darkness stupefaction.

Have mutual support for their function; [that is], any one of the constituents, with a view to effecting its own end, proceeds after taking the other two for its associates.

Have mutual production for their function; that is, are mutually productive, because all products contain within them the three constitutive factors.

Have mutual intercourse for their function; that is, consort together like male and female. The peculiarity here is that if one is dominant the others become feeble; this has been observed.

Sattvaṃ laghu prakāsham, ishṭam upashṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ |
guru varaṅakam eva tamaḥ, pradīpavac cārthato vṛttiḥ  |13|

13. Goodness is considered light and illuminating; passion exciting and mobile; darkness is heavy and enveloping. Their [co-operant] action, like that of a lamp, is purposive.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

With a view to explaining the peculiar characteristics of the constituent powers, it is said, Goodness, etc.

Light, endowed with lightness, and luminous, [i. e.,] on a sense being brought in contact with its object, it illuminates that object. Since when goodness triumphs the limbs are found to be light, and the senses capable of apprehending their objects, the marks of goodness are lightness and luminosity; of these the former is considered by the Sānkhya teachers to form the cause of effect-origination.

Exciting, leading to contact; mobile, changeful. Since the passionate is found [to co-exist] with union and action, excitability and changefulness are the marks of this constituent; such is the sense.

Heavy, endowed with heaviness, and enveloping, obstructive under the influence of darkness, the limbs are found to weigh down, and the perception of objects is impeded. Thus heaviness and obstructiveness to the proper effects by restraining the operation of the sense are the marks of this factor; this is the meaning.

But this statement creates specific differences among the constitutive powers; now, if they be thus mutually opposed, how can they energise together, for we never see foes so opposed working for the same end? To this it is replied, Their action, etc.: Like a lamp, which illuminates with the aid of oil and wick, though the three are mutually opposed; this is the sense. Oil is opposed to light, since if it falls upon it, it extinguishes it; similarly the wick, if too small, puts out the flame.

Avivekyādi hi siddhaṃ, traiguṇyāt tadviparyayebhāvāt |
kāraṇaguṇātmakatvāt, kāryasyāvyaktam api siddham  |14|

14. Want of discrimination and the rest are an inference from the [presence of the] three constituents and the absence thereof in the reverse. The Unmanifested is also demonstrated [to possess them] by the effect having the same properties as the cause.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Indiscriminativeness, etc., have been spoken of as attributes common to Nature and the rest. It is now explained how they are demonstrated to be there, Want, etc.

Indiscriminative here stands for indiscriminativeness. Want of discrimination and the other qualities mentioned before are not excluded in the case of Mahat, etc. Why? Because of [the presence of] the three constituents, since they possess those factors, same as Nature.

For those who prefer inference by the method of difference It is said, from the absence, etc. From the absence of the three constituents in the contrary, soul, where the opposite of this want of discrimination [is to be found]. Thus, where there is an absence of indiscriminativeness, there is also the absence of the three constituents, as in the case of Soul. Therefore there is a logical discontinuance. Consequently there is nothing to prevent the establishment [of the attributes in question] in Mahat and the rest.

But Nature has been described as non-distinct from Mahat, etc. Now, how is Nature established? It is replied, by the effect, etc.: If consciousness and the rest be without cause, then their permanence must follow, whence also non-liberation of soul. Therefore they must be products. If they are products, then they must have a cause with like qualities, for such alone is perceived to be the case. The cause also must be eternal, [or] from [the necessity of| premising a cause thereof, an [endless] series would result. Thus, Nature, the indiscrete One, is established, and by the use of the word too, it is demonstrated to possess the three constituents. This is the sense.

Bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt, samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravrittesh ca |
kāraṇakāryavibhāgād, avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya. |15|

15. Because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of production being from energy, because of discreteness between cause and effect, and because of unity in the universe.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Nature is next established as the cause from the nature of Mahat and the other modes, Because, etc.:

This [verse] is to be construed with the following, “there is a cause, Nature,” Whatever is divided is a difference [or kind, e.g.,] intellect, etc. Because of their finitude, their limited non-pervasive character, or because distinctively characterised through multiformity. That which is multiform and non-pervasive is an effect; consciousness and the rest, as assigned to individuals, are multiform and non-pervasive; therefore they have for their cause eternal and single Nature, [which is] competent thereto.

Another reason is stated: Because of homogeneity, that is, possession of the common quality of being marked by pleasure, pain and dullness. It is necessary for these mutually distinct [evolutes] to have a common cause possessing a like nature. This cause, because of its competency, is the Prime Evolvent and that alone; such is the meaning.

Nature, further, exists because of production through energy, because the activity of causes conducive to production [of works] is owing to competency. And Nature forms the material of   Power, [and] from it the evolute consciousness proceeds, as from transformation of earth seed sprouts into sapling; such is the sense.

Moreover, Nature exists because of discreteness between cause and effect. Though the effect subsists in the cause, yet by emerging therefrom, like the limbs of a tortoise, it becomes different through separation. Thus, the sense is that Nature is the sole cause of the particular conditions of the products, intellect and the rest.

Nature also exists because of undividedness in the universe. In vaiśvarūpya, the affix doesn’t change the sense [of the base]. Because of the non-existence of the three worlds as a distinct entity; in consequence, that is, of their dissolution by the assumption of the same form as their cause at the time of universal destruction. If there be no such cause the dissolution of these kinds cannot be in the same form; this is the meaning. It should not be said that Brahmā is such cause, and Nature need not be postulated. It is, in short, more proper to conceive Nature, as a force, than to conceive causality in the form of a thing possessed of force.

Kāraṇam asty avyaktaṃ, pravartate triguṇataḥ samudayāt ca|
pariṇāmataḥ salilavat, pratiprattiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt  |16|

16. There is a [general] cause, Nature, [which] operates by means of the three constituent powers, by conjunction and by modification, [varying] like water with the particular receptacle of the several powers.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

But if Nature be one, how can it produce various effects, for one single thread does not make a cloth? It is replied, There is, etc.:

The Unmanifested, which is the cause of the universe, operates or produces effects by means of the three constituent powers, goodness, etc. Now, since Nature is composed of the three factors, it has multiplicity within it; thus there is origination; this is the sense.

Whence similitude in production? It is replied, by conjunction [or] mixture. The meaning is that by coming together as principal and accessory, [it] produces a uniform effect, just like a picture [which is made of many colours].

Let consciousness and the other evolutes be uniform, whence comes diversity in other products? The answer is, with the receptacle, etc.; from the difference due to the receptacle of particular constituents; that is, the diversity is owing to inequality of constitutives.  For instance, by modification like water. As the same one liquid getting into a cocoanut or a citron is changed and acquires a sweet or bitter taste, so this also becomes diverse through the difference of associates. Such is the sense.

Saṃghātaparārthatvāt, triguṇādiviparyayād adhishṭhānāt |
puruṣo asti bhoktribhāvāt, kaivalyārtha pravrittesh ca  |17|

17. Since the assemblage [of sensible things] is for the sake of another, since there is a converse of the three constituents and the rest, since there must be superintendence, since there must be an experiencer, and since there is a striving for isolation, the Soul exists.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Having specified the proofs [of the existence] of Nature, [the author] proceeds to detail those of soul, Since the assemblage, etc. The five reasons in the oblative case are to be construed with “soul exists.”

Assemblage, the series ending with the earth (the gross elements); on account of this being for the sake or need of another, just as a bed and the like; “ need ” is enjoyment in the form of experience of either pleasure or pain; since this is not possible in the irrational, the rational, that is, the intelligent soul exists; this is proved by reasoning. Such is the sense.

Another cause is assigned, because of a converse, etc.: because of the negation or privation of the set started by the three constituents [viz., Intellect etc.]. Since the three constituents and their products are irrational and stand in the relation of cause but to particular effects, it is necessary that, as in the case of a jar and the like, they be correlative to a negation existing in something the absence of all products of the three constituents is possible [only] in soul; which is devoid of them; therefore soul is necessary as a support of a privation of the constitutives. Such is the meaning.

Another cause is stated, because of superintendence, that is, because of being a superintendent. As a chariot proceeds, guided by a driver, so all this too, being irrational, moves directed by Soul,—this [fact] must be admitted, even if not desired. Hence soul, which superintends [the operations of] the three factors, exists; such is the sense.

[Yet another cause is mentioned, because of an experiencer, an on-looker. Soul is necessary, as [a subject] which will apprehend all the manifested and the unmanifested principles, like the six flavours; such is the purport.

Another cause is specified, because of action for liberation. The good are seen energising for salvation, which is not possible in the case of Nature or any production thereof, because being composed of the three constituents they are invested with pleasure, pain and apathy. Therefore Soul is demonstrated to be, since it is connected with liberation, towards which an aspirant thereafter strives. This is the gist.

Janmaraṇakaraṇānāṃ, pratiniyamād ayugapat pravittesh ca |
puruṣabahutvaṃ siddhaṃ, triguṇāviparyayāc caiva  |18|

18. Because birth, death and the organs are severally allotted, and because activity is not simultaneous, and also because the factors are found unequally, the multiplicity of souls is established.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Having established the existence of soul, [the author] next proceeds to establish its multiplicity, Because birth, etc.

The multiplicity of souls is established. How? Because, etc. Birth is the union of soul with body; death its desertion thereof; the organs are eye and the rest. From seeing that they are severally allotted. If soul had been one this would not have been so; with the birth or death of one all would have been born or dead, on one possessing the eye all would have possessed it, on one seeing all would have seen, [and so on]. But it is not so; therefore souls must be many; this is the sense.

A second reason is assigned, because activity is non-simultaneous. Because there is diversity of energy; thus, while one applies himself to virtue, another does to knowledge, a third to dispassion, a fourth to power, a fifth to lust, and so on. If soul had been there would be a simultaneous activity of all for the same end. It is not so; therefore souls are many; this is the sense.

A third reason is stated, because of diversity in the three constituents. Eva is to be here construed after siddham, [the sense being], established [conclusively]. From the difference due to modification of the three constituents, as, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, and sometimes distress [predominates]. Or from the diversity (good, bad or dull of souls) due to [inequality of] the constitutive powers. If soul had been one, this would not be so, but all would be happy or miserable, and there would be no difference of high, low or middling conditions, through inequality of factors. It should not be argued that this is due to internal diversity, for that diversity itself has for its origin individual difference; otherwise that diversity would be not proven. This is the significance.

Tasmāc ca viparyāsāt, siddhaṃ sākshitvam asya puruṣasya |
kaivalyam mādhyasthyaṃ, drashṭitvam akartribhāvac ca  |19|

19. And from that contrariety [before specified] Soul is proved to be a witness, solitary, neutral, perceiving, and inactive.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

Having thus established the multiplicity of souls, its characteristics are [next] stated, since it is a fit object for discriminative knowledge; and from that, etc.

Because of the opposition to the three constituents is the absence thereof [in soul], that is, [the presence of] discriminativeness, non-objectiveness, non-generality, and non-fecundity. It is perceiving, because rational, knows the nature of its proper self, is aware that it is the Prime Cause which causes my migrations,’ ‘I am not migratory, but am untouched like a lotus-leaf.’ From being without modes, it is isolated, emancipated from extreme pain. Also [is marked by] neutrality, inability to do either good or evil. Non-activity, inaction, devoid of desire, hatred, exertion, etc. Therefore it is a witness, being the one sole form of knowledge. In objects that are active there is not this sole form of self-illuminating knowledge, wherefore a lamp, which is devoid of activity, etc., is seen to illuminate jars and the like. This is the purport.

Tasmāt tatsaṃyogād, acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgaṃ |
guṇahkartritve ca tathā, karteva bhavatīty udāsīna  |20|

20. Therefore, through union therewith, the insensible products seem intelligent; [and Soul, though] indifferent appears like an agent, though the activity is of the cosmic factors.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

But [if] agency resides in Intellect and sensibility in Soul, whence do the two appear to have the same receptacle [when it is said] ‘I know,' ‘I do this ’? To this it is replied, Therefore, etc.:

Since sensibility and agency have been demonstrated by reasoning to possess different receptacles (or substrata), this is an error; this is the sense. The root of the error is conjunction therewith. The conjunction, proximity, or reflection of Soul, thence is the [seeming] sensibility of the unintelligent modes, [viz.,] intellect and the rest, [which], as if intelligent, appear to cognise, ‘I know’ Thus the constituents, the factors of goodness, misery and dullness, being active, their activity, which is in intellect, gets reflected in Soul, which, though indifferent, [thereupon] appears like an agent, [saying]’I do’. Whence cognitions like ‘I know,’ ‘I do this’ are errors, which result from an interchange of attributes due to non-perception of difference between the two entities [Nature and Soul], because this [erroneous] character of the two [cognitions, ‘I know,'  ‘I do,'] has been ascertained, This is the gist.

Puruṣasya darshanārthaḥ, kaivalyārthas tathā pradhānasya |
pangvandhavad ubhayor api, saṃyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ  |21|

21. In order that Soul may contemplate Nature and be separate, the union of the two, like that of the lame and the blind, lakes place; [and] thence creation springs.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

The reason of this conjunction is now explained, In order, etc.:

The construction is that the conjunction of Nature and Soul has for its ends, contemplation and liberation. Contemplation is experience of Nature by Soul. Liberation is salvation of Soul arising from recognition of otherness between it and Intellect. This is impossible without Nature. Hence of the two union, or proximity causing the relation of experiencer and experienced, follows. Such is the sense. To illustrate how the action of each needs the support of the other: like the lame and the blind. Similar to the union of the lame and the blind, the former shows the way to the latter, the latter carries the former; this is the meaning.

It is then said that from conjunction follows creation, which is like a door to experience and absolution, Thence, etc.  Evolution, which has intellect and the rest for its products, is due to conjunction; such is the sense. Consequently there shall be no evolution at the period of general dissolution, there being [then] an absence of such conjunction of the two. This is the drift.

Prakṛter mahāms, tato ahaṃ, kāras, tasmād gaṇash ca shodashakaḥ |
tasmād api shodashakāt, pañcabhyaḥ pañca bhūtāni  |22|

22. From the Prime Evolvent [proceeds] intellect, thence self-apperception, thence the sixteen-fold set; from five out of those sixteen [proceed] the five elements.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

The order of creation is next detailed, From Nature, etc.

The manner is this: from one Nature springs the slightly inferior Intellectual principle, itself a part and comprising other parts; the parts thereof being intellects, which are as numerous as souls, of a size fitting them to enter into bodies, and which come into existence for experience by Soul. It is Nature alone that fills them. In like manner, the lesser Egoism springs from Mahat and has for its part subtle forms as numerous as souls and similarly subsisting for experience thereby. The sixteen-fold set comprises the eleven senses, sound, etc., enumerated below, and the five rudiments.

From five out of these sixteen, that is, from the rudiments, the five gross elements proceed; thus, from rudimental sound ether, which has the quality of sound; from rudimental touch, in conjunction with rudimental sound, air, which has the qualities of sound and touch; from rudimental form, in conjunction with rudimental sound and touch, fire, which has the qualities, of sound, touch and form; from rudimental flavour in conjunction with rudimental sound, touch and form, water, which has sound, touch, form and flavour for its qualities; from rudimental smell, in conjunction with rudimental sound, touch, form and flavour, earth, which has sound, touch, form, flavour and smell for its qualities. So the text sums up: “Ether has been said to possess one quality, air two, fire three, water four, and earth five.”

It should not be argued that the five gross elements spring from self-apperception, this being impossible, since they possess the qualities of sound, etc., which egoism does not. Nor is there anything to prove that egoism possesses these qualities; if it did then ether and the rest should each possess all the five qualities.  Again, since anything possessing these qualities, which are apprehensible by the external senses, must be a gross element, egoism itself becomes one, and thus a cause of itself, [which is absurd]; this causation of the gross elements is also opposed to the scripture. Nor should it be contended that the elemental rudiments cannot proceed from self-apperception since that is devoid of sound and other [qualities]; for, as on putting together lime etc. with turmeric and the like, from the mixture arises redness, so from the union of intellect and egoism the production of rudimental sound and the rest is not improbable. Nor again, should it be said that the gross elements similarly proceed from egoism, for grossness having for its invariable concomitant causality by objects possessing its peculiar qualities, the inference that it ultimately is rudiment-originated, excludes causation by self-apperception.  This has been elsewhere expatiated upon.

The elemental rudiments are elements in which soothing, terrifying and dulling peculiarities find no place or subsistence. Soothing, i.e., pleasant, terrifying, i.e. painful, and dulling, i.e., stupefying. Rudiments, fit for divinities, are wholly sweet, through excess of agreeableness. They are not apprehensible by us, in fact, being unfit [for our senses] on account of their subtlety.

Adhyavasāyo buddhir, dharmo jñānaṃ virāga aiśvaryam |
sāttvikam etadrūpaṃ, tāmasam asmād viparyastam  |23|

23. Intellect is determination. When affected by goodness its modes are virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power; when affected by darkness they are the reverse.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

The characteristics of Intellect are next specified, Intellect, etc.:

Determination in the form that this is to be done by me is a modification or particular condition of Intellect, as flame is of a lamp. Thus synonymously spoken of because there is no distinction between a modification and the modified. The senses are necessary in order to diversify percepts for the homogeneous (or uni-charactered) Soul ; mind is necessary in order to bring about a contact with sense-objects ; egoism in order to render possible a knowledge of the Meum in the mental determination taking the form ‘ this is for my good ’; and intellect in order to induce determination calculated to restrain exertion in the matter of impossible things, like rain.  This should be supplied.

The functions of Intellect are now specified, Virtue, etc. Virtue (or piety), due to bathing in the Ganges and the like, as also to practising the eight-fold austerities.

Knowledge, an intuition of Soul. Dispassion, which is four-fold, according to the names, ‘ incipient,' ‘ discriminating,' ‘ all but perfect,' and ‘ perfect ’; incipient is the beginning of renunciation  for the purpose of ripening (or dissolving) passion and the like worldly attachments ; discriminating is separating, like a physician, the ripe faults from the unripe  by the force of discriminative knowledge, [which is] in the process of acquisition ; all but perfect is a faint longing [after objects of enjoyment, which remains] in the mind [even] after a consciousness that all the passions are ripe ; [and] perfect dispassion is the quieting even of this [mental] unrest by destroying all worldly attachments. Power is eight-fold, viz., “atomicity, magnitude, and lightness of the frame; attainment by the senses, free volition as to the seen and heard; supremacy [or] power to compel ; control or non-attachment to the constituents; and getting whatever is desired,'’ Of the frame ‘atomicity’ [or] minuteness, ‘ magnitude’, expansion over leagues, [and] ‘lightness’ like cotton; ‘ attainment’ is the power in the senses by the force of which one touches the sphere of the moon with the tip of his finger while standing on the earth; ' free volition’ is the non-crossability of purposes in the matter of [objects] seen and heard, as one sinks into the earth as in water, etc.; ‘supremacy’ [is the power] to compel all beings and their products at a wish; ‘control’ is independence of the constituents, beings, etc. ;  is power to carry out resolves is ‘getting’ or attaining whatever is desired.

The opposites of these are vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. Of these, vice, due to adultery and the like ; ignorance, [e.g., consideration of house, field and other transitory things as permanent, association of purity with impure [things like] bodies of women etc., association of happiness with the world [which is] full of misery, identification of bodies, etc., which are distinct from Soul, with Soul, [so as to say] ‘I am fair,’ etc.; passion is lust for objects of sense ; weakness is constraint against one’s will.

Abhimāno ahaṃkāras, tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ |
ekādashakash ca gaṇas, tanmātra pañcakañ caiva  |24|

24. Self-apperception is egoism. Thence proceeds only a two-fold creation, [namely,] the eleven-fold set of sense, and the fivefold set of elemental rudiments.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

The characteristics of Self-apperception are specified, Self-apperception, etc.:

Egoism is conceit of self, internal belief that ‘I know,' I do,' ‘this is to serve my end,’ ‘this I possess,' etc. The cause thereof [is] self-apperception. Since cause and effect are not different, egoism is [said to be] self-apperception. It [even] defines Soul as an [empirical] ego, though not so definable; [thus] this self-conceit, through non-perception of difference, seems to be also in Soul; but this is not self-apperception; such is the sense.

Its products are described, Thence, etc.: What is created is ‘creation,' From self-apperception proceeds the sixteen-fold set, which, through internal difference, is divisible into two. The two kinds are specified, the eleven-fold, etc. From this self-apperception [springs] of sense a set or series of eleven, and also of rudiments a set of five. The word only (eva) excludes other sets.

Sāttvika ekādashakaḥ, pravartate vaikṛtād ahaṃkārāt |
bhūtādes tānmātraḥ, sa tāmasas taijasād ubhayaṃ  |25|

25. From self-apperception, when modified [by goodness], proceeds the good eleven-fold set; from it, as the source of the elements issue the rudimentary particles, [and] these are dark; [while] both [emanations] follow from it when affected by activity.

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya

But self-apperception is unitary; how does then a dual creation proceed from it? In answer it is said, From self-apperception, etc.

The eleven-fold set of sense is good because light and illuminating: proceeding from modified egoism, which is the term the Sānkhya teachers use for that in which the constitutive of goodness predominates.

The rudimental set proceeds from the origin of elements, that is, egoism in which darkness is dominant. Why? Because it is dark, imbued with darkness, which, it is proper, should spring from a cause of like nature.

But if evolution be owing [only] to the good and dark constituents, what is the use of passion? To this it is replied, both, etc.: Both the sets proceed from preponderant passion. Goodness and darkness being naturally non-active, the work of both, [inasmuch as it proceeds] from the urging of passion, is really the work of the latter constituent. Therefore this factor also has its utility; such is the sense.

The term “modified” applied to the source of the senses implies power to produce small work ; the term “element-originant” applied to the source of the rudiments implies darkness and capability for great work; the term “active” applied to [egoism when] affected by passion implies competency for creation. This is to be understood.